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PRODUCING DEMOCRATIC VIBRANCY^
K. Sabeel Rahman*
INTRODUCTION
In the years since Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,1 the contours of the debates over the First
Amendment,2 free speech, and democracy are by now familiar. On
the one hand, there is the anxiety that economic wealth—whether
from corporations or wealthy individuals—could effectively
purchase political influence through the mechanism of unregulated
campaign contributions and expenditures or independent
expenditures on electoral advocacy. On the other hand, there are
concerns about attempts to regulate such campaign contributions
^ This short comment is adapted from remarks presented at the Brooklyn Law
School Symposium, “Free Speech Under Fire: The Future of the First
Amendment,” February 2016. I am grateful to Joel Gora, Nick Allard, Rick
Hasen, and Bradley Smith for our excellent panel discussion on Money and
Speech. Thanks also to Heath Brown, Jacob Hacker, and the Scholars Strategy
Network for a parallel discussion on “Purchasing Power” and the future of
research in money and politics, held at the Ford Foundation in June 2016.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School;
PhD, Harvard University Department of Government; M.Sc Economics for
Development, University of Oxford; M.St Sociolegal Studies, University of
Oxford; A.B. Harvard University.
1 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2 U.S. Const. amend. I. Compare Bradley A. Smith, Citizens United gives
freedom back to the people, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/01/16/citizens-united-gives-freedom-
of-speech-back-to-the-people/ (arguing that the holding in Citizens United is
consistent with the principles of the First Amendment), with Liz Kennedy, 10
Ways Citizens United Endangers Democracy, DEMOS (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.demos.org/publication/10-ways-citizens-united-endangers-
democracy (arguing that Citizens United has been detrimental to the democratic
process, let alone the First Amendment).
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and expenditures as governmental interference with the freedom of
speech. I share in both these concerns—that economic wealth
generates disparities in political power and influence, and that we
need a variety of legal protections and structures to secure the
political freedoms that make democracy possible. But in this short
essay, I suggest that we need to broaden how we conceptualize the
elements of democratic vibrancy and responsiveness, while
recognizing that this change will have important implications for the
legal and policy debates around democracy reform. In short, I argue
that a vibrant democracy is not just one that protects free speech and
electoral accountability; it is also one that empowers a wide range
and diversity of constituencies to not only consume speech, but also
to produce it, to be fully empowered political actors with the
opportunity to shape and participate in the political process as more
than just voters.
In developing this argument, this paper begins by examining our
common underlying normative understandings of what a vibrant
democracy looks like. How we understand democratic vibrancy and
success necessarily informs our diagnoses of democratic failures,
and our design of possible remedies for those failures. The money-
in-politics debate can often get stuck in an impasse between those
who think that the problem of campaign finance and corruption
taints the democratic process, and those who think that the
autonomy of the voter makes such anxieties unnecessary. In contrast
to either of these views, I suggest that we approach the theory of
democratic vibrancy and failure from a different angle: the degree
to which individuals and communities are empowered to act not as
voters “consuming” political speech, but rather as producers of
political speech and democratic action—as fully fledged political
agents capable of mobilizing, organizing, advocating, and running
for office.
This shift in focus to the potential inequities and disparities in
the production of political speech and action points to a second
important reorientation in this debate, away from the narrow focus
on First Amendment doctrine and campaign finance reform—as
important as these issues are—to the much broader set of laws,
institutions, practices, and norms that comprise our foundational
infrastructure for democratic vibrancy. Our toolkit for assuring a
robust democratic polity involves a much wider range of possible
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reforms and interventions extending beyond electoral financing to
encompass the very design and operation of ordinary policymaking
institutions—and we will need all of these tools, not just doctrinal
or campaign financing ones, to address the failures of twenty-first
century American democracy.
This paper proceeds in three parts. Part I offers a brief critique
of the doctrinal and theoretical focus in many campaign finance
debates on the autonomy of the voter-as-consumer, overlooking the
importance of disparities in who speaks, acts, or runs in politics. Part
II then outlines the ways in which our current system of democracy
produces problematic disparities in the production of political
action—whether by limiting who runs for office, or narrowing the
scope for meaningful political influence and advocacy by interest
groups. Part III concludes and suggests a number of avenues for
legal, doctrinal, and policy reform that extend beyond the traditional
confines of the First Amendment and money-in-politics debate.
I. THEORIZINGDEMOCRATICVIBRANCY AND FAILURE
One of the dominant underlying theories of democracy in this
money and speech debate rests on the metaphor of the political
marketplace. In this view, a vibrant democracy is understood in
market terms: the competition between opinions and claims in the
public sphere and the competition between parties and candidates
for votes.3 In this marketplace view of democracy, democratic
vibrancy is assured by two factors: first, market openness to a
variety of speakers, opinions, and candidates; and second, the
sovereignty of the consumer, whether the listener of speech or the
voter.4 So long as we protect against undue inhibitions or restrictions
on the menu of choices in the political arena, and so long as the voter
remains autonomous to freely choose among ideas or candidates,
then democracy is secured.
3 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (evoking the metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas” as a key First
Amendment value); see also David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of
Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance Law, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 239–45
(1991) (critiquing the marketplace of ideas metaphor).
4 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Cole, supra note 3,
at 239–45.
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In many ways, the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence expresses this
consumerist, market-based vision of democracy.5 Chief Justice
Roberts has at times expressed in powerful terms the importance of
a robust, competitive electoral process as the font of democratic
accountability and legitimacy, particularly in the face of an
increasingly powerful and expansive administrative state.6 We can
read the protection of corporate speech in Citizens United7 as more
than just an extension of the Buckley v. Valeo equating of campaign
expenditure to speech.8 Arguably, the Citizens United approach is
also enabled in part by a belief in the centrality of the voter-
consumer: so long as the voter-consumer has autonomous choice—
in deciding what to think and how to vote—the proliferation of
speech is an unalloyed good, regardless of speaker or mechanism.
The distrust of campaign finance regulations in turn can be
motivated not just by the appeal to the primacy of First Amendment
free speech values, but also by a conviction that in a world of
autonomous, sovereign voters, the distortion, corruption, or taint
alleged by critics of corporate expenditures and excess money in
politics is simply not a problem. Similarly, the Shelby County v.
Holder9 decision—which struck down the preclearance regime of
the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) requiring certain states to secure
pre-approval from the Federal government before enacting any
changes to voting laws—can be understood in such market-oriented
terms. Roberts’ argument that the preclearance regime for
congressional oversight of state election laws is now outdated10
amounts to a push for a kind of deregulation of the political
5 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Cole, supra note 3,
at 239–45.
6 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 499 (2010) (“One can have a government that functions without being ruled
by functionaries, and a government that benefits from expertise without being
ruled by experts. Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern
themselves, through their elected leaders. The growth of the Executive Branch,
which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life,
heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from
that of the people.”).
7 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
8 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–22 (1976).
9 Shelby County v. Holder, 466 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
10 See id. at 2618.
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marketplace, justified by an underlying belief in the sovereignty and
autonomy of the voter-consumer. So long as voters have freedom of
choice, the political marketplace is likely to produce democratically
legitimate outcomes. On this view, “market-distorting” regulations
like the VRA11 should be dismantled as soon as the empirical
evidence of their necessity is no longer present.
Now, this is not to say that Roberts is correct about either of
these market-based analogies for democratic politics. Campaign
financing by corporate actors can distort the democratic process, and
the danger of racially disparate efforts to restrict access to vote in
the absence of VRA protections is very real. More broadly, as
several scholars have argued, the political marketplace envisioned
by the Roberts Court is a fiction. The Lochner12 Court presumed a
well-functioning labor market in which freedom of occupational
choice ensured sufficient social welfare such that regulations would
necessarily be liberty- and welfare-reducing. Similarly, Citizens
United and Shelby County both valorize and idealize the political
marketplace in part to justify its deregulation.13 The lived reality of
politics is quite different, characterized not by autonomous voter
choice but rather by the accumulation of disparities of power that
can subvert and distort the political process.
If the marketplace analogy is flawed, how then should we
conceptualize a vibrant, successful democratic system? It is here that
a problem arises among critics of the voter-consumer orientation of
democracy-as-market, in the implicit theories of democratic
11 52 U.S.C. § 10101, amended by 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
12 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13 See, e.g., Jedidah Purdy, The Roberts Court vs. America, DEMOCRACY J.
(Nov. 23, 2012), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/23/the-roberts-court-v-
america/ (“The Supreme Court . . . was protecting the interests of employers under
the disingenuous claim of preserving everyone’s liberty equally . . . Lochner-era
cases gave constitutional weight to an ideological view of the economy: that the
market was a realm of individual freedom that should be kept separate from
government interference, which would corrupt the virtuous effects of private
bargaining.”); Ellen D. Katz, Neo-Lochnerianism on the Roberts Court, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 1615 (2009) (“[D]ecisions [have] suggest[ed] that a distinct approach to
election law [wa]s emerging in the Roberts Court. It [wa]s an approach that
s[ought] to avoid active federal engagement with the state-created rules regulating
democratic participation; and it [wa]s one that assumes and demands an electorate
that is both legally literate and diligent.”).
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vibrancy. The concern about political corruption and money in
politics is most often articulated in the context of what we might call
a “good governance” theory of democracy. On this view, money is
understood as an external taint, a contaminant that skews, distorts,
or corrupts the otherwise virtuous political process. Thus, we see an
emphasis on policies focused on insulating politics from the
influence of money, through provisions such as revolving door
limits, increased restraints on lobbying, or transparency measures
that would bind policymakers more directly to the public will. The
implication is that if we can insulate to sterilize politics of the
influence of money, then rational, deliberative, “good government”
will result.
But this view of democratic defect and remedy—while correct
in its anxiety over money in politics—is problematic. Attempts at
sterilizing the policymaking process, however well-intentioned,
have to be viewed with some degree of skepticism, for it seems
unlikely that insulation can redress the fundamental problem of
disparate political power. More well-resourced and sophisticated
individuals and groups are likely to overcome higher barriers to
political entry; conversely, the groups most politically disempowered
are more likely to be “screened out.” At the same time, there is
something to the reality that the ordinary mechanics of political
organizing, mobilizing, advocacy, and even running for office, do in
fact require some forms of financing and expenditure to be effective.
Indeed, democratic vibrancy requires a protection not just of the
ability of voters to consume information, but also the agency of
diverse constituencies to produce political acts: running for office,
engaging in public voice and advocacy, and the like. This alternative
way of conceptualizing democratic vibrancy points to a different
way in which money in politics and political corruption can be
dangerous, and a different focus for remedying these democratic
defects. On this alternative view, the most pernicious effect of
money in politics is not the literal contamination of legislative or
policy decisions, or the flipping of electoral results. Rather, the
problem arises from the more subtle ways in which disparities in
wealth and income result in disparities in political power and
influence—particularly in skewing which individuals and groups
mobilize, organize, lobby, or run for office in the first place. This is
not a problem of the “consumption” of speech or the autonomous
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consumerist choice of the voter; rather, it is a problem of production
of both speech and political action. Further, if the dangers of
disparate wealth producing disparate political power are most
directly felt in these subtle mechanisms for generating democratic
political action, then it follows that the most urgent need for reform
is to develop measures that expand the capacities of more diverse
individuals and constituencies to mobilize, organize, and run for
office. In other words, the central challenge is in equalizing the
opportunity for political participation—in broadening the
production of political speech and action.
II. INEQUALITY AND THE PRODUCTION OF POLITICALACTION
In recent years, the empirical social science literature has
dramatically increased our understanding of the multiplicity of ways
in which economic wealth and power can convert into political
power, thus skewing the democratic process.14 These analyses are
distinctive in how they focus less on the corruption of the voter, and
more on disparities in the production of political speech and
action.15
In the years since the Citizens United decision, there has been
much empirical debate about the degree to which campaign
spending literally purchases votes. Some of the older literature
suggests that campaign spending—especially on expensive
television ads—has rapidly diminishing returns in terms of altering
14 See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMYOF THENEWGILDEDAGE (2010) (documenting the divergence between
political preferences and influence by wealth); MARTINGILENS, AFFLUENCE AND
INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012)
(showing that public policy is more responsive to the preferences of wealthier
citizens); Martin Gilens & Benjamin Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564 (2014)
(arguing that theories of elite interest group influence are most consistent with
empirical evidence); Benjamin Page et al.,Democracy and the Policy Preferences
of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51 (2013) (showing the link between
wealthy citizen preferences and policy outcomes) .
15 On the distinction between consumerist and producerist approaches to law
in context of economic regulation, see, e.g., JamesWhitman,Consumerism versus
Producerism, 117 YALE L.J. 340 (2007).
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vote totals for candidates.16 Others have argued that Citizens United
itself changes relatively little, as corporate leaders were already
sophisticated lobbyists and campaign contributors and will continue
to find ways to generate political influence despite campaign finance
regulations.17 But this approach to the debate misunderstands the
ways in which economic power can be leveraged to produce
disparities of political power in today’s democracy. The new social
science of today’s “Gilded Age” has increasingly confirmed the
dramatic degree to which, on the whole, our democratic system is
more responsive to the preferences of wealthy citizens, and
relatively unresponsive to the preferences of middle or working
class constituencies.18 More recent research into this disparity in
responsiveness suggests that the problem of money in politics is
more subtle than just a simple flipping or tainting of elections or
voter choice.19 The real mechanisms through which wealth
generates disparate political power involve the creation of
disparities in the production of political speech and action.
First, the “production” of political speech and action can be
warped by disparities in economic wealth and influence by affecting
the supply and actions of political leaders themselves. Legislators
16 See, e.g., Gary Jacobson, Money and Votes Reconsidered: Congressional
Elections, 1972-1982, 47 PUB. CHOICE 7 (1985) (suggesting diminishing returns
in terms of vote share for increased campaign spending); Alan Gerber, Estimating
the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using
Instrumental Variables, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 401 (1998) (“[I]n an average
Senate election the incumbent's spending advantage yields a 6% increase in the
incumbent's vote share. That incumbent spending wins elections has direct
implications regarding the consequences of campaign finance reform.”).
17 See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform, 57
B.C. L. REV. 1127, 1127–29 (2016) ("Individuals have long been entitled to spend
their money to influence elections, and prior to Citizens United, savvy, well-
represented corporations knew how to do so as well."); Heather K. Gerken,
Symposium, Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. U.L. REV.
1155, 1157 (2011) ("[W]e don't really know whether Citizens United has opened
the corporate floodgates.").
18 See BARTELS, supra note 14, at 27–28; GILENS, supra note 14.
19 See infra notes 20–28 and accompanying text; LAWRENCE LESSIG,
REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS – AND A PLAN TO STOP IT
133 (2011).
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may be dependent on campaign funders and donors.20 New research
suggests that candidates able to rapidly raise early money are the
ones most likely to win primaries, and in turn win elections;
candidates lacking in access to wealthy networks of donors are
generally not even considered by voters and public opinion polls.21
Once candidates actually enter into office, their ability to represent
their constituents is warped by the “time tax” of the campaign
financing system: as candidates spend the bulk of their time
fundraising, they have less time for interacting with constituents or
studying pertinent issues.22 Furthermore, elected officials may share
a common socioeconomic or cultural background as economic
elites, leading them to favor more elite-friendly policies. The degree
to which political leaders share a social, cultural, and class
background with more economically elite constituencies shapes
how they interpret and respond to policy problems, leading to a more
subtle, but hugely important, form of elite influence. If the only
candidates who succeed are those with access to elite networks and
are themselves elites—whether by educational level, occupational
background, or income—then our electoral institutions are, in a very
real sense, not representative.23
20 LESSIG, supra note 19, at 104; ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN
AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 216
(2014).
21 See, e.g., ADAM BONICA, PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS, EARLY
FUNDRAISING, AND CANDIDATE SUCCESS 7–9 (June 3, 2016),
http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/bonica_professional_
networks_early_fundraising_and_electoral_success.pdf (“[I]t is hard to dismiss
the importance of fundraising considerations in the determining who runs for
office. The initial round of fundraising provides resources needed to get the
campaign up and running. It can also be a matter of survival.”).
22 Congressman John Sarbanes has made this point about time allocation
central to his arguments for campaign finance reform. See, e.g., John Sarbanes,
The Government by the People Act (H.R. 20), JOHN SARBANES: REPRESENTING
MARYLAND’S THIRD CONG. DISTRICT, https://sarbanes.house.gov/bythepeople
(last visited Oct. 21, 2016) (“More than ever, the wealthy and well-connected are
flooding our politics with big-money campaign contributions. Candidates –
dependent on these contributions to run competitive campaigns – are caught up in
a bad system. Instead of being able to spend their time talking to their constituents
and representing their communities, candidates must court big donors.”).
23 NICHOLASCARNES,WHITE-COLLARGOVERNMENT: THEHIDDENROLE OF
CLASS IN ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING 11 (2013).
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Second, disparities in economic resources dramatically shape
the landscape of political associations. Organizing and mobilizing
citizens and communities into effective political advocates takes
sustained investment of funding and resources. Disparities in those
funding streams can produce disparities in interest group activity,
which in turn has demonstrable impacts on public policy outcomes.
Business interests may be more effective in organizing as an interest
group, particularly in their investment in the ecosystem of lobbying
and advocacy organizations leveraged to influence federal and state
legislatures. The decline of organized labor may have accelerated
this shift in the balance of power among such lobbying and advocacy
groups—and this shift in the balance of power among civil society
groups can explain the shift in public policy to favor elite interests.24
Legislatures themselves may be especially vulnerable to these
disparities in lobbying influence, in part because of their own
declining resources—financial, human, temporal—to conduct
independent policy research and draft legislation.25 The proliferation
of think tanks, policy shops, and model legislation through business-
oriented networks like the American Legislative Exchange Council
(“ALEC”) has enabled business groups to take advantage of state
and local legislators’ limited research and time capacity to push a
business-friendly agenda.26
These democratic defects can be understood not at the level of
the voter-consumer and their autonomous choice among options in
the political marketplace of ideas or candidates; rather, they can be
seen as failures in the production of democratic political speech and
action—in the dynamics shaping who runs for office, who mobilizes
24 JACOB HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW
WASHINGTONMADE THERICHRICHER—ANDTURNED ITSBACK ON THEMIDDLE
CLASS 291 (2011).
25 See e.g., LEE DRUTMAN, POLITICAL DYNAMISM: A NEW APPROACH TO
MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK AGAIN, NEW AMERICA (2016),
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/12404-political-dynamism-
2/political_dynamism.c416ce23ca23482b8da8f0feaf14dbb3.pdf (describing how
the loss of resources and capacity in part explains the vulnerability of legislatures
to special interest influence).
26 Alex Hertel-Fernandez & Theda Skocpol, How the Right Trounced
Liberals in the States, DEMOCRACY J., Winter 2016, at 1,
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/39/how-the-right-trounced-liberals-in-
the-states/.
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for political advocacy, how these actors operate, and how policies
are proposed and passed. The disparities in these areas speak to the
subtle but far-reaching ways in which economic wealth and influence
can skew our political process—in effect, mapping out the
mechanisms for the kind of “dependency,” “corruption,” and
“plutocracy” that campaign finance advocates like Larry Lessig,
Zephyr Teachout, and Richard Hasen have argued against.27 This
“producerist” focus on the political marketplace in turn orients us
towards remedies that focus on overcoming the barriers preventing
a wide range of communities from producing candidates for office
or effective political advocacy associations.28 It also orients us
towards the normative goal of enabling more citizens and
communities to play a role as political actors, expanding the ability of
groups to mobilize and organize, and of candidates to step forward.
III. BEYOND THE FIRSTAMENDMENT: ENABLINGDEMOCRATIC
VIBRANCY
This focus on the production of political action suggests we need
a more diverse and variegated toolkit of responses that extends
beyond the current confines of the First Amendment, free speech,
27 See LESSIG, supra note 19, at 15 (arguing that dependency is an
institutional weakness, but not an individual evil and that dependency on
corruption lead to modern campaign finance); TEACHOUT, supra note 20, at 2
(arguing that “gift rules . . . that survived through most of American legal
history . . . is at the foundation of the architectures of our freedoms. Corruption,
in the American tradition, does not just include blatant bribes and theft from the
public till, but encompasses many situations where politicians and public
institutions serve private interests at the public’s expense”); RICHARD HASEN,
PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 9 (2016) (arguing a “voucher + limits”
program should be put in place where each voter receives $100 in campaign
finance vouchers to donate to political institutions, candidates or interest group.
Further, $25,000 should be the limit per person for any single federal election).
28 For a discussion on the “producerist” political standpoint, see e.g, James
Q. Whitman, Consumerism versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law,
117 Yale L.J. 340 (2007) (“When we speak of producerism, we are not speaking
of any particular legal program, but of law that tends to focus on rights, interests,
and most especially conflicts on the supply side. Indeed, as we shall see, the
producerist worldview generally supposes that the problems of the law are very
much problems of conflict between different classes of producers.”).
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and campaign finance debate. Democratic vibrancy requires more
than simply the autonomous choice of the voter or the insulation of
politics from the taint of monied influence. Instead, it requires
measures that expand the capacity of individuals to mobilize,
organize, advocate, and run for and hold office. We must focus not
just on the electoral process, but on the degree to which our
democratic infrastructure enables the political agency of all
democratic citizens and constituencies.29
One of the reasons why proposals for matching funds in
campaign finance are so critical is that matching funds can not only
address the immediate problem of expenditures in campaigns; they
also help speak to these other dimensions of the production of
political action. A robust matching funds regime expands the
demographics of who runs, potentially altering the composition of
decision-makers. It also enables a wider range of constituencies to
more effectively mobilize and advocate for their views in the
electoral arena.30 But matching funds are not the only tools to
achieve these important shifts.
First, election law needs to expand the ability of individuals to
run for office and for diverse political associations to compete in the
political marketplace. As legal scholars Sam Issacharoff and Rick
Pildes have suggested, there is an argument for undoing the two-
party duopoly on political competition, preventing “lockups,” and
enabling more diverse party associations.31 These goals might
encompass legislative as well as doctrinal changes—for example,
passing laws and undoing precedents that prevent party fusion of the
kind in operation in New York state, where third parties like the
Working Families Party can appear on the ballot listing nominees of
29 For a fuller discussion of the normative value of democratic agency, see
e.g., K. SABEELRAHMAN, DEMOCRACYAGAINSTDOMINATION (2016).
30 See Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy,
and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 105–06 (2004) (arguing that campaign
finance reforms should focus on empowering more citizens to participate as
donors and candidates).
31 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 668 (1998); Richard
Hasen, Symposium, The “Political Market” Metaphor and Election Law: A
Comment on Issacharoff and Pildes, 50 STAN. L. REV. 719, 720–24 (1998)
[hereinafter Hasen, The “Political Market”Metaphor].
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one of the major parties,32 or by the creation of nonpartisan
redistricting commissions to prevent partisan gerrymandering, as
several states are now attempting.33
Second, we need to expand the ability of a wider range of
constituencies to mobilize, organize, and advocate for their views in
the political process. This means investing in the financing and
infrastructure of community organizing to empower a wider range
of communities to engage in political advocacy and action.34 These
investments in the political capacity of communities also must
involve programs that facilitate the development of a pipeline of
political leaders who come from more diverse backgrounds and are
able to pursue pathways into public service, whether through elected
or appointed office. Elsewhere, I have suggested that we might
redesign regulatory and other governance institutions to make them
more inclusive of a wider range of constituencies, engaging and
empowering countervailing power in formulating policies.35
The problem of money in politics, then, is not just about
inequalities in spending. Nor are the remedies exhausted by focusing
32 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997)
(upholding Minnesota’s ban on fusion, where one candidate may be listed on the
ballot by multiple parties); see also Hasen, The “Political Market” Metaphor,
supra note 31, at 724.
33 See, e.g., Angelo Acheta, Redistricting Reform and the California Citizens
Redistricting Commission, 8 HARVARD L. & POL’Y REV. 109 (2014) (on the
potential of nonpartisan redistricting commissions); Davis v Bandemer, 478 US
109 (1986) (holding partisan gerrymanders to be justiciable). But see Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 US 267 (2004) (showing a divided court’s disagreement on the
appropriate standards and rationale for judicial review of partisan gerrymanders).
34 See, e.g., Building Institutions and Networks, FORD FOUND.,
https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/challenging-inequality/building-
institutions-and-networks/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2016) (describing a strategic shift
towards investing in civil society organizations that can empower communities in
a durable way); HAHRIEHAN, HOWORGANIZATIONSDEVELOPACTIVISTS (2014)
(describing the importance of building long-term organizing capacity).
35 See K. SABEEL RAHMAN, RETHINKING REGULATION, ROOSEVELT INST.
(Apr. 2016), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Rethinking-
Regulation.pdf; RAHMAN, DEMOCRACYAGAINSTDOMINATION, supra note 29, at
139–65; K. Sabeel Rahman, The Key to Making Economic Development More
Equitable is to Make it More Democratic, NATION (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-key-to-making-economic-development-
more-equitable-is-making-it-more-democratic/.
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narrowly on campaign finance reform. The threats to our democracy
are much broader, in the speech not spoken, the candidates not run,
the items left off the agenda. We need a democratic infrastructure
that enables a widespread opportunity to engage in meaningful
political action—whether through mobilizing, organizing, and
advocacy, or through a truly inclusive pipeline of candidates and
decision-makers. This in turn means working not only at the
doctrinal level, but also through statutory and regulatory structures,
and through civil society and associational life.
This broader approach to the problem of democratic vibrancy is
in many ways beyond the purview of judicially enforced First
Amendment doctrine. Instead, it channels the underlying values of
the First Amendment in these other contexts of the production of
political action. As I and many other constitutional law scholars
have suggested, constitutional values need not require judicial
enforcement, but rather might be better channeled as catalysts for
political narratives, social movements, and novel regulatory or
legislative remedies that effectuate constitutional values through
other means.36
In the First Amendment context, we might do well to consider
how the Amendment’s underlying normative values might inform
these alternative channels for political action and reform outside of
the courts. As Professor Burt Neuborne suggests, the First
Amendment itself is kind of a poem describing the full “arc of a
democratic idea—from conception to codification.”37 Democracy
requires the freedom to think independently, then to speak and
assemble on behalf of those ideas, and then to petition the
government to respond adequately. This “narrative of democracy”
necessarily links the First Amendment to a variety of other legal and
political concerns outside of the Free Speech or Assembly clauses,
36 See K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional
Political Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal
Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (2016); Joseph Fishkin & William E.
Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 685 (2014);
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICANCONSTITUTION (2010).
37 BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 18 (2015).
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including voting rights and gerrymanders.38 These normative values
of democratic political action narrated by the First Amendment must
also suffuse our sub-constitutional structures and practices,
informing our attention to the infrastructure of our democracy—the
ecosystem of political associations, organizing and mobilizing
constituencies and the pipelines of candidates and leaders who need
to be developed and empowered to run for office. These are the
structures we need to expand and invest in to make our democracy
inclusive, dynamic, responsive, and vibrant.
38 Id. at 17–18.
